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Abstract
In the past decade, public scrutiny surrounding rising levels of executive compensation
has led to more stringent independence requirements for compensation committees.
However, there is little research studying the effects of compensation committees on
executive pay from the time these new requirements were implemented. My paper
studies the effects of compensation committee chair personal ties to the CEO, economic
interests, and group committee characteristics on both the level and structure of CEO
compensation. My findings suggest that certain committee chair personal ties to the CEO
are associated with both a higher level of CEO compensation and a higher percentage of
CEO salary compensation. I also find that the more compensation committee chairs are
paid, the less likely they are to create CEO pay plans with strong incentive provisions,
but the more likely they are to increase the level of total CEO compensation. The higher
the  committee  chair’s  ownership  percentage is in the company, the less likely they are to
create low-risk CEO pay plans, and the more likely they are to increase the level of total
CEO compensation.
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I. Introduction
There is extensive research surrounding the level and structure of CEO
compensation, but not much of it focuses on the effects of compensation committee
characteristics on executive pay. This research has been limited in the last ten years,
during which new regulations were implemented with the goal of increasing
compensation committee independence.
Compensation committees play an integral role in the executive pay-setting
process, acting on behalf of shareholders to structure and approve of CEO compensation
(Murphy, 1999). Ideally, compensation contracts would be structured to create incentives
for the CEO to act in the best interests of the company and its shareholders (Tosi,
Gomez-Mejia; 1989). Setting CEO pay is typically viewed from a principal-agent
perspective in which the CEO (agent) acts on behalf of the shareholders (principal). The
presence of compensation committees adds a new dimension to the principal-agent model
because they are intended to represent the principal, but may have personal and/or
economic interests of their own (Conyon and He, 2004). These interests may come in the
form of a friendship with the CEO, or even as increased compensation for serving on the
board. If they have an incentive to structure CEO compensation in a certain way, they
may not always act on behalf of shareholders.
Compensation committee independence requirements have become stricter over
the past ten years due to new regulations in response to recent accounting scandals and
the  public’s  heightened sensitivity to rising executive pay in a time of national financial
distress. The purpose of this paper is to use data from 2013 to consider recent regulatory
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changes and to observe the effects of close personal ties to the CEO, economic incentives
to act in favor of the CEO, and general committee characteristics on the level and
structure (percentage of contingent versus non-contingent pay) of CEO compensation.
While these strict regulations are in place to ensure that compensation committees are
unbiased, it is important to consider the costs that come with implementing them. If they
have been ineffective at changing the pay-setting environment, there are important
considerations for the future.
I run two separate cross-sectional regressions using data from fiscal year 2013 to
measure effects on the percentage of CEO compensation that is a fixed salary and on the
total level of CEO compensation. My findings suggest that certain committee chair
personal ties to the CEO are associated with both a higher level of CEO compensation
and a higher percentage of CEO salary compensation. I also find that the more
compensation committee chairs are paid, the less likely they are to create CEO pay plans
with strong incentive provisions, but the more likely they are to increase the level of total
CEO compensation. The  higher  the  committee  chair’s  ownership  stake in the company,
the more likely they are to increase the level of total CEO compensation.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part II discusses the regulations governing
compensation committee independence passed in the last decade. Part III is a review of
relevant literature in this subject area and provides a motivation for my research. Part IV
states my hypotheses regarding three categories of independent variables. Part V
discusses my data and methodology. Part VI contains my regression results and analysis,
and Part VII is my concluding remarks and suggested areas for further research.
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II. Background and Regulatory Changes
In theory, shareholders are responsible for board member elections. In practice,
the nomination process is run by the board of directors where the CEO has a significant
influence, and the shareholder election is seen as more of a formality especially since
there is often only one nominee for the position (Hoffman, 1984). This often leads to
board members hand selected by the CEO, and it is often the case that “the CEO and
front-runner get along best when they share a personal chemistry and common
background”  (Lublin,  2014).
While the compensation committee is not a perfect representative of shareholder
interests (Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 1988), independence requirements are in place to
ensure that the level and structure of CEO compensation both reflect company goals and
benefit shareholders. The public has increasingly scrutinized executive compensation
levels in recent years (Morris, Martini and Jaskot, 2012), and the SEC has responded with
new regulations to eliminate the possibility of unfair practices between directors and
management and to require them to disclose more detailed information in their proxy
statements.
In 2003, the NYSE and Nasdaq adopted new rules regarding compensation
committee independence, requiring the committee to be entirely independent (NYSE) or
that executive compensation be approved by a majority of independent directors if the
compensation committee is not already solely comprised of independent directors
(Nasdaq) (Morris, Martini and Jaskot, 2012). Past studies have examined the effects of
having insiders on the committee, however, this regulation has forced most compensation
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committees to consist entirely of independent board members. The vast majority of
companies now include a section on Compensation Committee Interlocks and Insider
Participation in their proxy statements in which they state that no member of the
compensation committee was an employee during the fiscal year. If this section is not
included in the proxy statement, they address the new independence guidelines in the
Director Independence section, stating that they abide by the new guidelines.
The 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DoddFrank) contains several new considerations surrounding compensation committee
member independence. In January 2011,  the  SEC  adopted  the  “Say  on  Pay”  requirements  
in Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which require companies to hold a shareholder
vote at least once every three years on their approval or disapproval of executive
compensation  and  “golden  parachute”  arrangements.  The  outcome  of  these  votes  is  nonbinding, but companies must report the results in their annual proxy statements ("SEC
Adopts Rules for Say-on-Pay and Golden Parachute Compensation as Required Under
Dodd-Frank Act", 2011). This could impact the way compensation committees structure
CEO pay because while the votes are not binding, a publicly unpopular CEO
compensation  plan  could  damage  a  company’s  reputation.
In June 2012 the SEC adopted new rule 10C-1 of the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934. This rule includes requirements regarding compensation committee member
independence and the use of compensation consultants and related disclosures (Lynn,
Bard, and Kahan 2013). New considerations under this  rule  include  “(A)  a  director’s  
source of compensation, including any consulting, advisory or other compensatory fee
paid by the issuer to such director, and (B) whether a director is affiliated with the issuer,
4

a subsidiary of the issuer, or an affiliate of a subsidiary of the issuer”  (Adler, 2012).
These requirements are in place further to monitor the pay-setting process from a
regulatory standpoint. Because independence requirements have become stricter over the
years, and especially since the bulk of research has been performed on older data, my
study will be useful as a first effort to evaluate the impact of recent regulatory changes on
the independence of compensation committee members and how they construct CEO pay.
III. Literature Review
Prior research on the effects of compensation committees on CEO pay has been
inconclusive as a whole. Past studies tend to focus on a narrow set of independent
variables with conflicting results when compared to similar studies. The most recent
paper I could find uses data from 1992 to 2001, well before recent independence
requirements were implemented.
Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, and Dalton (1998) conducted an earlier study focusing
on the effects of the compensation committee on executive pay. They examined the
effects on pay associated with the proportion of insiders on the committee, whether the
directors were appointed while the current CEO was in office, and whether the director
was a current CEO of another company. They studied the levels of non-contingent pay,
contingent pay, and total compensation. They find these characteristics have no
significant effect on CEO compensation, which suggests that the level of director
independence does not unfairly favor the CEO (Daily et al., 1998). While my paper
includes similar independent variables, I use the percentage of CEO compensation that is
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a fixed salary as one of my dependent variables rather than the levels of compensation
alone to study the effects on the structure of CEO pay packages.
Andersen and Bizjak (2003) studied whether greater compensation committee
independence affects CEO pay, whether the CEO on the committee leads to a more
beneficial pay structure, and whether CEO pay contained a larger proportion of equity
incentives after 1993. The congressional tax code in 1993 specified that compensation
committees must have at least two outside directors, otherwise contingent executive pay
over $1 million would not be tax deductible. Similar to other studies, they find little
evidence that CEO pay mix is affected by insiders on the committee—even committees
with a high proportion of insiders had significant equity based compensation. They also
find no relationship between higher pay and a lower proportion of equity incentives when
the CEO was present on the compensation committee. Last, they discovered that the
regulations in 1993 had little effect on the structure of CEO compensation. Their paper
examined companies through 1998. New regulations regarding independence have been
passed in 2003 and again in 2011 and 2012, providing motivation for my paper, which
will observe whether they have affected CEO compensation in 2013.
There have also been studies examining the effects of social similarities between
the CEO and the compensation committee chair on CEO compensation. Belliveau,
O’Reilly,  and  Wade (1996) examined social capital similarity between the CEO and the
compensation committee chair, and the effects on CEO pay. They point out that the payperformance relationship has only weak evidence to support it based on past studies, and
that it is important to investigate the extent to which social factors affect CEO pay. They
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measure social  capital  in  terms  of  “amount  and  prestige  of  social  resources”  and  find that
similarity does affect CEO compensation. They measured social capital in terms of social
similarity and status by identifying overlaps in the backgrounds of the CEO and the
committee chair. Some of these measures included whether they worked at the same firm,
attended the same undergraduate or graduate institution, and the number of shared
Fortune 500 board memberships. To measure status they looked at the number of board
memberships, trusteeships, social club memberships, and the prestige of their
undergraduate institution. They find that in situations containing lower-status
compensation committee chairs and in relationships in which the CEO is of a higher
status than their compensation committee chair, the CEO receives higher compensation
(Belliveau,  O’Reilly  and  Wade 1996). While my paper does not include detailed
measures of social capital, I include variables to measure possible committee chair ties to
the CEO such as whether the chair was appointed by the current CEO, whether the chair
is or was a CEO, whether they are the same gender, and their age difference.
A more recent article relevant to my study is by Conyon and He (2004). They use
a sample of IPO firms to examine the relationship between compensation committee
characteristics, CEO compensation, and the proportion of CEO incentives. They
approached the  study  through  the  “three-tier  agency  theory”  which  states  that  if  the  
compensation  committee’s  interests  are  more  closely  aligned  with  the  shareholder’s,  they  
will act in the best interests of the shareholders. If their interests are more closely aligned
with management, they will act in the interests of the CEO. The primary variables they
looked  at  were  compensation  committee  members’  ownership  stake  in  the  firm,  cash fees
received by the compensation committee, insiders on the compensation committee, and
7

the proportion of directors who were currently CEOs at other firms. They find that a
higher director ownership stake in a company is associated with a higher proportion of
equity incentives and a lower level of CEO pay. Conversely, they find that the more
compensation committee members are paid, the lower the proportion of equity incentives
and the higher the CEO pay. Similar to the previous studies, they find no relationship
between CEO pay and insiders on the compensation committee (Conyon and He, 2004).
These results suggest that economic incentives have a significant effect on how CEO pay
is structured. In my paper I use fixed salary as a percentage of total CEO compensation as
one of my independent variables rather than the proportion of equity incentives. In
theory, compensation committees with an incentive to act in the CEO’s  interests will
raise fixed salary in relation to contingent pay to provide the CEO with a less risky
stream of income.
Brick, Palmon, and Wald (2006) also study CEO and director compensation and
find a strong positive relationship between the two. They suggest this could indicate
“mutual  back  scratching  or  cronyism.”  Their  data  covers  the  time  from 1992 to 2001,
before the major recent independence requirements were passed. While I also study
director compensation and CEO compensation, my data only focuses on the
compensation committee chair. My study also uses newer data to capture the effects of
recent regulatory changes.
My study enhances the previous literature by using similar independent variables
as previous studies, but combining those that capture both personal and economic
incentives of the compensation committee chair and group dynamics of the committee to
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gain a more wholesome understanding of what factors drive compensation committees to
structure CEO compensation in a certain way. My paper also uses data from 2013,
providing more recent information. Brick, Palmon, and Wald’s (2006) data covered the
time between 1992 and 2001, and there have been many regulatory changes that directly
affect the responsibilities of the compensation committee since then. I test the hypothesis
that because of the extensive independence requirements that exist, personal and
economic incentives of compensation committee chairs no longer affect compensation
structure, suggesting that the pay-setting process has become more impartial.
IV. Hypotheses
According to agency theory, independent board members result in more
effectively functioning committees (Daily et. al, 1999). There are certain factors,
however, that could jeopardize this independence and influence the compensation
committee to construct pay packages based on CEO interests. My hypotheses are formed
around the concept that if the compensation  committee’s  interests  are  more  aligned with
the CEO, they are likely to set higher levels of compensation with lower levels of risk. If
their interests are more aligned with shareholders, they are likely to set lower levels of
total compensation with higher levels of risk. A higher percentage of CEO compensation
that is a fixed salary suggests a lower-risk pay package because the fixed salary is a
determinable and reliable amount. My independent variables are split into three different
categories and include compensation committee chair demographics and personal ties to
the CEO, their economic interests, and group characteristics of the committee.
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The first group of independent variables measures a  committee  chair’s
demographics and personal ties to the CEO using director age, gender, whether the
director and the CEO are the same gender, the age difference between the director and the
CEO, whether they were appointed by the current CEO, years serving as a director of the
company, whether they were or currently serve as a CEO of another company, and
whether the CEO is on the board of the company.
Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, and Dalton (1998) study the effects of whether the
CEO appointed the director. They explain that not only do CEOs tend to choose directors
who  will  be  “sympathetic  to  their  viewpoints,”  but  also  that  directors  appointed  by  the  
CEO could feel indebted to them for giving them the position. Also, because CEOs have
an influence in the nomination process, they are more likely to pick directors with whom
they have had a previous relationship. I include a variable measuring whether the CEO is
a member of the board, because in this case they are more likely to have personal
relationships with board members.
Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, and Dalton (1998) also study the variable of whether
the director was or is a CEO of another company. They explain that CEOs tend to share
similarities with one another, including prestige in the business world. Because they can
relate to the CEO they could be more likely to create pay packages that align with their
own preferences rather than with those of shareholders. I include variables measuring
demographic similarities between the compensation committee chair and the CEO
because people who are similar demographically tend to be more sympathetic to one
another.
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Hypothesis 1: Greater director social/demographic similarities and personal ties to
the CEO will result in a compensation package with a higher percentage of salary
compensation and a higher level of total compensation.
The second category of independent variables looks  at  the  committee  chair’s  
economic interests: Director cash fees, director total compensation, and director
ownership stake in the firm. If the compensation committee chair receives a higher
amount of compensation from the company, they could be more likely to create a pay
package that is aligned with the CEO’s  interests (Conyon and He, 2004). This could be
because the director feels obligated to return the favor, or it could indicate a mutual
agreement between the director and the CEO.
High equity holdings align compensation committee chair interests with those of
shareholders  because  their  personal  wealth  is  affected  by  the  company’s  performance,  
giving them an incentive to do what they can to increase firm value (Conyon and He,
2004). So, if they have a higher ownership stake in the company, they could be more
likely to structure pay packages with more equity incentives and therefore a smaller fixed
salary percentage. A higher percentage of equity incentives would theoretically motivate
the CEO to perform well since it is not a fixed stream of income.
Hypothesis 2: Higher director compensation will result in a higher percentage of
salary compensation and a higher level of total compensation.
Hypothesis 3: Higher director ownership stake in the firm will result in a lower
percentage of salary compensation and a lower level of total compensation.
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Compared to the other two groups of independent variables, economic interests of
compensation committee members are likely to have a greater influence on their paysetting decisions. This is because aligning compensation decisions with CEO interests
based on a personal relationship or demographic similarity does not necessarily lead to a
future reward. People respond to incentives, and a higher level of compensation is a
directly measurable financial reward.
Hypothesis 4: Economic incentives will have a more significant effect on the
structure and level of CEO compensation than demographic similarity/personal
relationship variables or group dynamics variables.
The third category looks at compensation committee group dynamics using the
size of the committee and the number of meetings held during the year. Previous research
has been inconclusive about the effect of committee size on CEO compensation. Some
argue that large groups are less likely to be cohesive and make sound decisions, and that
board members can be manipulated more easily (Daily et al. 1999). Fewer meetings
could indicate readily accepting a pay package proposal rather than deliberating over a
fair pay structure, leading to compensation more aligned with CEO interests.
Hypothesis 5: The smaller the committee and the greater the number of meetings
held during the year, the lower the percentage of salary compensation, and the lower the
level of total compensation.
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V. Methodology and Data
In this paper I will test my hypotheses by running two separate cross-sectional
regressions using my primary independent variables and a set of control variables. All
data is from fiscal year 2013.
Equation 1:
I use the following regression equation for firm i to measure the effects of my
independent variables on the percentage of CEO compensation that is a fixed salary,
denoted  as  “SalaryPercentage.”  “Demographic/PersonalTies”  represents  the  first  group  of  
independent variables, “EconomicInterests”  represents  the  second  group  of  independent  
variables (using the natural log of director cash compensation and director total
compensation instead of the absolute levels),  and  “GroupDynamics”  represents  the  third  
group of independent variables as described in Section IV. The last six variables are
controls measuring CEO gender, tenure, and age; the natural log of total assets; return on
assets; and industry dummies.
SalaryPercentagei = β1Demographic/PersonalTiesi + β2EconomicInterestsi +
β3GroupDynamicsi + β4MaleCEOi + β5CEOTenurei + β6CEOAgei + β7Ln(TotalAssets)i
+ β6ROAi + β7IndustryDummiesi
The percentage of CEO compensation that is a fixed salary is calculated as CEO
Salary/Total CEO Compensation. CEO Salary and Total CEO Compensation are from the
ExecuComp Annual Compensation dataset. Total  CEO  Compensation  is  called  “TDC1”  
within the database and is the sum of salary, bonus, other annual compensation, total
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Table I

Summary Statistics-Continuous Variables
Variable
Independent Variables
Years Serving as Director
Director Age
Absolute Value of Age Difference
Director Cash Fees
Director Total Compensation
(in 1000s)
Director Ownership Percentage
Committee Size
Meetings
Dependent Variables
CEO Total Compensation
(in 1000s)
CEO Salary/CEO Total Compensation
Control Variables
Years Serving as CEO
CEO Age
Ln(Total Assets)
ROA

Variable
Independent Variables
Male Director
Same Gender
Director was/is a CEO
CEO is a Director
Director Appointed by CEO
Control Variables
Male CEO

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Min

Max

10.09
64.06
9.63

9
65
9

6.46
7.48
6.52

0
35
0

44
84
31

206.02

211.92

80.09

0

495.12

0.0987%
4.12
5.88

0.0432%
4
6

.870%
1.13
2.17

0
2
1

13.4%
10
13

6,674.93

4,811.40

6,082.73

18.00

37,186.1

0.216

0.166

0.162

0

1

7.21
56.67
8.35
0.0452

5
56
8.28
0.0494

6.56
6.88
1.64
0.100

0
40
3.73
-1.14

42
86
12.60
0.248

Summary Statistics-Binary Variables

Percentage of Data
83.7%
82.7%
62.5%
98.1%
38.8%
97.1%

value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted (using the BlackScholes option formula, (Black and Scholes, 1973)), long-term incentive payouts, and all
other total compensation. The motivation behind using this variable is that a higher
proportion of compensation that is a fixed salary is less risky to the CEO because it is a
reliable amount of compensation they will receive at the end of the year. Other
components of pay are based on company performance and whether certain goals are
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met. So, if a compensation committee chair has incentive to act in favor of the CEO, they
could  raise  the  CEO’s  fixed  salary  in  relation  to  other  forms  of  compensation  to  help  put  
them in a more secure and predictable financial position.
Equation 2:
The following regression equation is identical to the first, but the left hand side
variable is the natural log of total CEO compensation (“TDC1  as  described  above),  
denoted as “Ln(TotalCompensation).”
Ln(TotalCompensation)i = β1Demographic/PersonalTiesi + β2EconomicInterestsi +
β3GroupDynamicsi + β4MaleCEOi + β5CEOTenurei + β6CEOAgei + β7Ln(TotalAssets)i
+ β6ROAi + β7IndustryDummiesi
The motivation for using total compensation as the dependent variable is to
evaluate the effects of possible personal and/or economic director ties to the CEO from a
different angle. The first dependent variable I study focuses on the structure of CEO
compensation while this one focuses on the amount of compensation.
I collected my data from ExecuComp, COMPUSTAT, and company proxy
statements. Within ExecuComp, I used the Annual Compensation database to form a
sample frame of the companies for which I would collect additional data. This data
included all of the variables measuring CEO compensation, age, gender, and whether the
CEO was a member of the board of directors. I eliminated all observations except for
those with a currently listed CEO, leaving 638 companies for 2013. I then sorted the data
based on the percentage  of  the  CEO’s  total  compensation that was a fixed salary, ending
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up with 312 observations. I deleted some observations because their proxy statements did
not provide sufficient data.
I obtained information on committee chair compensation from the Director
Compensation database within ExecuComp and matched up the observations by
company. This database contained variables measuring the amount of director
compensation. I  then  collected  additional  information  from  each  company’s  2013  proxy  
statement in the DEF14-A filings on the SEC website. These variables included:
committee chair age, gender, years serving as a director, whether they were/are a CEO,
ownership stake in the company, compensation committee size, and number of
compensation committee meetings held during the fiscal year.
In  Table  I,  “Years  Serving  as  Director”  is  the  number  of  years  the  committee  
chair  has  served  as  a  director  of  the  company.  “Director  Age”  is  the  age  of  the  committee  
chair  in  years.    “Absolute  Value  of  Age  Difference”  is  the  absolute  value  of  the  age  
difference  between  the  committee  chair  and  the  CEO.  “Director  Total  Compensation”  is  
the total compensation received by the committee chair from the company in 2013 in
thousands of dollars. “Director  Ownership  Percentage”  is  committee  chair  beneficial  
ownership  as  a  percentage  of  total  company  shares  outstanding.  “Committee  size”  is  the  
number of members of the compensation committee. “Meetings”  is  the  number  of  
meetings the compensation committee held during 2013.  “CEO  Total  Compensation”  is  
total CEO compensation received in 2013 in thousands of dollars. “CEO  Salary/CEO  
Total  Compensation”  is  the  percentage  of  CEO  compensation  that  is  a  fixed  salary.  
“Years  Serving  as  CEO”  is  the  number  of  years that the current CEO has been serving.
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“CEO  Age”  is the age of the current CEO in years. Ln(Total Assets) is the natural log of
the  total  assets  of  the  company  during  2013.  “ROA”  is  return  on  assets  and  was  
calculated by dividing Net Income/Total Assets.
The variable  “Male  Director”  takes  a  value  of  1  if  the  compensation  committee  
chair  (“committee  chair”) is a male, and a 0 if female. “Same  Gender”  takes  a  value  of  1  
if the committee chair and the CEO are the same gender, and a 0 otherwise. I ultimately
dropped this variable due to multicollinearity in my regressions, but it is interesting to
include in the summary statistics. “Director  was/is  a  CEO”  takes  a  value  of  1  if  the  
committee chair was or is currently a CEO of another company and a 0 otherwise.    “CEO  
is  a  Director”  takes  a  value  of  1  if  the  CEO  is  a  current  director  on  the  company  board  
and  a  0  otherwise.  “Director  Appointed  by  CEO”  takes  a  value  of  1  if  the  committee  
chair  was  appointed  while  the  current  CEO  was  already  in  office.  “Male  CEO”  takes a
value of 1 if the CEO is a male, and a 0 if female.
I use several control variables to account for the effects of CEO characteristics,
company size, performance, and industry. I collected the firm and market information
from COMPUSTAT for the companies in my data set. I control for certain CEO traits by
including variables for age, gender, years serving as the CEO, and their equity stake in
the firm. To measure company size I use the natural log of total assets. I initially included
the number of employees and total market value, but ultimately dropped both because all
three were highly correlated with one another. To measure company performance, I use
Return on Assets (ROA) by dividing Net Income/Total Assets using the values for 2013.
To  take  industry  differences  into  account,  I  shortened  each  company’s  SIC  code  into  its  
2-digit identifier and created dummy variables for each 2-digit code associated with ten
17

or more companies in my sample. All uncategorized 2-digit codes are combined as a base
case excluded dummy variable.
2-Digit SIC Code Descriptions
2-digit SIC Code
36
60
35
73
28
49
37
38
20
50

Number of Occurrences
31
30
20
19
18
17
15
15
13
12

Industry Description
Electronic & Other Electric Equipment
Depository Institutions
Industrial Machinery & Equipment
Business Services
Chemical & Allied Products
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services
Transportation Equipment
Instruments & Related Products
Food & Kindred Products
Wholesale Trade – Durable Goods

My data has a few limitations. First, ideally I would have collected data over a
longer time period to capture the before and after effects of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.
Second, I would have collected information on every company available within the
ExecuComp database. However, because much of the data I used came from firm proxy
statements and had to be entered manually, I restrict my attention to a smaller sample.
VI. Regression Results and Analysis
This section presents the regression results and analysis of my study. The first
regression results are displayed in Table II and use CEO salary as a percentage of total
compensation as the dependent variable to measure the effects on how CEO pay
packages are structured between contingent versus non-contingent pay. The second
regression, with results displayed in Table III, uses total CEO compensation as the
dependent variable to examine the effects on the total amount of CEO pay. Both tables
display the results of four different regressions— column one focuses on economic
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interest variables, column two focuses on demographic/personal relationship variables,
column three focuses on group dynamic variables, and column four combines all
independent variables. When discussing coefficients, I use the results displayed in
column four. All four columns take all of the control variables into account.
i. Salary as a percentage of total CEO compensation
In Table II, the dependent variable is CEO salary as a percentage of total
compensation. All independent variables were insignificant to CEO salary percentage
except for the CEO being a member of the board and the natural log of total director
compensation.
If the CEO is one of the directors, the percent of CEO compensation in salary is
higher by 9.69 percentage points on average, holding other things constant. This is
significant at the 10% level with a t-statistic of 1.77 and is consistent with my hypothesis.
If the CEO is on the board of directors, the CEO is more likely to develop friendships and
personal relationships with other board members, including members of the
compensation committee. This causality could also go the other way because when the
CEO is present on the board, the CEO has a significant influence in the director
nomination process and could hand pick people with whom they either share a previous
connection with or who they believe will be sympathetic to their interests. Either way,
this connection to the CEO could influence the compensation committee chair to set a
higher percentage of  salary  in  the  CEO’s  pay  package.    There  are  no  cases  in  which  the  
CEO is on the compensation committee.
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Table II

Effects on the Structure of CEO Compensation

This table displays the results of the regression of the percent of CEO compensation that is a fixed
salary on several independent variables. *, **, and *** note significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels. T-statistics appear in parentheses. All data is from 2013.
Dependent Variable = CEO Salary/CEO Total Compensation
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Male Director
0.00936
0.0103
(0.39)
(0.50)
Director was/is a CEO
-0.0194
-0.0161
(-1.01)
(-0.97)
CEO is a Director
0.0521
0.0969*
(0.83)
(1.77)
Years Serving as
0.00109
0.00214
Director
(0.63)
(1.39)
Director Appointed by
-0.0237
-0.0265
CEO
(-0.92)
(-1.16)
Director Age
-0.000531
-0.000214
(-0.34)
(-0.15)
Absolute Value of Age
0.000740
0.0000618
Difference
(0.38)
(0.04)
Ln(Director Cash Fees)
0.0183
0.0172
(1.19)
(1.11)
Ln(Director Total
-0.180***
-0.187***
Compensation)
(-8.41)
(-8.53)
(in
1000s)
Director Ownership
-1.55
-1.759
Percentage
(-1.12)
(-1.24)
Committee Size
0.000586
0.00037
(0.07)
(0.05)
Meetings
-0.00196
0.00358
(-0.49)
(1.01)
Male CEO
0.00624
-0.0245
-0.00759
-0.0139
(0.14)
(-0.48)
(-0.15)
(-0.31)
CEO Tenure
-0.000581
0.00172
0.000895
0.000160
(-0.43)
(0.90)
(0.59)
(0.09)
CEO Age
0.00279**
0.00315*
0.00313**
0.00228
(2.21)
(1.76)
(2.16)
(1.46)
Ln(Total Assets)
0.0279***
-0.0391***
-.0412***
-0.0176***
(-4.68)
(-7.00)
(-7.29)
(-3.18)
ROA
-0.111
-0.0741
-0.0623
-0.133*
(-1.48)
(-0.85)
(-0.73)
(-1.74)
Industry Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R2

1.100***
(8.77)
302
0.3559

0.365***
(2.74)
312
0.1784

0.402***
(4.04)
312
0.1798

1.050***
(7.28)
302
0.3630
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If director total compensation increases by 10%, the percentage of CEO
compensation that is salary is lower by 1.87 percentage points on average, holding other
things constant. This is significant at the 1% level with a t-statistic of -8.53 and does not
follow my hypothesis. Conyon and He (2004) found that the more directors were paid,
the smaller the percentage of equity incentives in CEO total compensation, suggesting
that they were doing the CEO a favor in return for higher pay. However, this study used
data from before the major recent independence requirements were implemented.
Looking at the reverse, I hypothesized that higher director compensation would be
associated with a higher percentage of CEO salary. My results suggest that directors are
paid more when CEOs are given more incentive-based compensation. This could signify
that the pay-setting environment has changed since the previous studies were completed.
Directors  are  being  paid  more  for  “doing  a  good  job,”  and  now  that  means  looking  out  for  
shareholder interests and structuring more incentive-based pay packages rather than
rewarding the CEO for paying them more. While a stretch, these results indicate that the
recent regulations may have made a difference. However, more extensive research is
needed to make a definitive statement about whether the regulations affected this change.
Economic incentives are by far the most significant group of compensation
committee characteristics affecting CEO pay structure, which is what I predicted in my
hypotheses. The first regression focusing on economic incentives has an R2 of 0.36 while
the other two looking at personal and group dynamics characteristics have an R2 of 0.18
and 0.18, respectively. When combining all of the variables, the R2 is 0.36.
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ii. Total CEO Compensation
In Table III, the dependent variable is the natural log of total CEO compensation.
Compared to the previous regression, this regression led to a wider range of significant
variables. Total CEO compensation is negatively correlated with the director being a
male, and positively correlated with the director being a current or former CEO, the
director being appointed by the CEO, total director compensation, and director ownership
stake in the company.
Unlike in the first regression, one demographic variable and two variables
indicating director ties to the current CEO are significant. If the compensation committee
chair is male, total CEO compensation is 18.7% lower than if the director were female.
This is significant at the 10% level and has a t-statistic of -1.74. This is an interesting
observation because 97.1% of the CEOs in my sample are male. There are only three
cases in which there is both a female committee chair and CEO. This result indicates that
the female committee chairs in my sample set higher levels of CEO compensation than
the males, on average.
In the business world, females are widely perceived as of a status lower than
males. Gayle, Golan, and Miller (2010) point out that they are given fewer promotion
opportunities, tend to take more time off to have and raise children, and thus limit their
ability to build experience in pace with their male counterparts. In my sample 83% of the
compensation committee chairs are male; 44% of the female compensation committee
chairs and 66% of the male committee chairs are current or former CEOs.
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Table III

Effects on the Level of CEO Compensation

This table displays the results of the regression of total CEO compensation on several independent
variables. *, **, and *** note significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. T-statistics appear in
parentheses. All data is from 2013.
Dependent Variable = Ln(CEO Total Compensation)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Male Director
-0.168
-0.187*
(-1.39)
(-1.74)
Director was/is a CEO
0.275***
0.260***
(2.83)
(3.01)
CEO is a Director
0.0396
-0.160
(0.12)
(-0.56)
Years Serving as
-0.00381
-0.00789
Director
(-0.43)
(-0.98)
Director Appointed by
0.261**
0.297**
CEO
(2.00)
(2.49)
Director Age
0.0115
0.0104
(1.42)
(1.40)
Absolute Value of Age
0.00238
0.00421
Difference
(0.24)
(0.47)
Ln(Director Cash Fees)
0.0418
0.0601
(0.51)
(0.74)
Ln(Director Total
0.890***
0.889***
Compensation)
(7.77)
(7.80)
(in 1000s)
Director
Ownership
9.38
13.607*
Percentage
(1.27)
(1.85)
Committee Size
0.0123
0.00438
(0.29)
(0.12)
Meetings
0.00284
-0.0246
(0.14)
(-1.33)
Male CEO
-0.237
0.0144
-0.157
-0.0351
(-1.01)
(0.06)
(-0.59)
(-0.15)
CEO Tenure
0.00494
-0.0146
-0.00377
-0.00759
(0.68)
(-1.49)
(-0.48)
(-0.82)
CEO Age
-0.00245
-0.00440
-0.00658
0.000824
(-0.36)
(-0.48)
(-0.87)
(0.10)
Ln(Total Assets)
0.241***
0.331***
0.345***
0.225***
(8.62)
(11.65)
(11.70)
(7.78)
ROA
0.460
0.502
0.339
0.665*
(1.15)
(1.13)
(0.76)
(1.67)
Industry Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Constant
Observations
Adjusted R2

1.810***
(2.69)
302
0.4896

5.021***
(7.41)
312
0.3878

5.955***
(11.46)
312
0.3586

1.088
(1.45)
302
0.5223
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Belliveau,  O’Reilly,  and  Wade  (1996)  found  that  committee  chairs  of  a  status
lower than the CEO tend to set higher levels of compensation—the committee chair
being a current or former CEO would put them at a more equal status. Because of the
perceived lower status of females in the business world, and the fact that a larger
percentage of females in my sample are not current or former CEOs, this could impact
the way they set CEO compensation levels.
While a somewhat bleak analysis, there have been promising signs of change.
Many companies with female CEOs have a greater number of women sitting on the board
of directors. Between 2004 and 2008, large companies with three or four female board
members performed significantly better than boards with no female directors, and boards
including female directors have been said to function better and to “make  better  
decisions”  according  to  Maggie  Wilerotter,  CEO  of  Frontier  Communications  Corp
(Lublin, 2014). Since 2009, the proportion of females in the boardroom has increased
from 12.5% to 15.8% in S&P 1500 firms. While the business world has been slow to
change,  Gracia  C.  Martore,  chief  of  Gannet  Co.  says  that  “It’s  time  to  take  a  chance  on  
women.”  (Lublin, 2014).
My results also indicate that if the compensation committee chair was or is a
CEO of another company, total CEO compensation is 26.0% higher. This is significant at
the 1% level and has a t-statistic of 3.01. This follows my hypothesis and could have two
different interpretations. Whether the compensation committee chair was or is a CEO
indicates a background overlap with the CEO that comes with a certain level of prestige.
This could give the committee chair incentive to raise the level of CEO compensation
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because they have a similar background and can empathize with them. However, this
contradicts  Belliveau,  O’Reilly,  and  Wade’s  (1996)  findings  that  lower  status  
compensation committee chairs set higher levels of CEO compensation. Also, companies
like to hire compensation committee chairs familiar with their industry. So, if they are a
CEO of a company in the same industry it is more likely that they know one another.
Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, and Dalton (1998) examined the effect of appointing
the compensation committee chair, explaining that the chair could feel indebted to the
CEO for giving them a job and, in turn, raise the level of CEO compensation. However,
they did not find this to be significant. My results indicate that if the compensation
committee chair was appointed after the current CEO took office, total CEO
compensation is 29.7% higher than otherwise. This is significant at the 5% level with a tstatistic of 2.49 and consistent with my hypothesis. CEOs have a major say in who is
appointed to the board, so the significance of this variable could also be attributed to the
possibility that the CEO and the committee chair knew each other previously and already
have an established relationship with one another. So, not only would the committee
chair feel indebted to the CEO, but the chance of also knowing each other previously
could influence the committee chair to set a higher pay level. Because both this variable
and the committee chair being a current or former CEO are significant, it indicates that
compensation committee chairs with personal ties to the CEO are more likely to create
pay packages with a higher level of compensation.
For every 10% increase in total director compensation, CEO compensation
increases by 8.89%. This is significant at the 1% level and has a t-statistic of 7.80. This
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follows my hypothesis, indicating that compensation committee chairs are influenced by
economic interests. While these results are  definitely  not  proof  of  a  “you scratch my back
and I’ll  scratch  yours”  situation,  they  indicate  that  a  higher  level  of  committee  chair  
compensation is correlated with a higher level of CEO compensation. This is also
consistent with Conyon and He (2004) and Brick,  Palmon,  and  Wald’s  (2006)  findings.  
This variable had the highest t-statistic in the regression, supporting my hypothesis that
economic incentives have a more significant effect on CEO compensation than other
compensation committee characteristics. In the first regression, the negative relationship
between CEO salary percentage and total director compensation indicated a possible
change in the pay-setting process since the new independence regulations were passed.
The results from this regression do not invalidate this possibility, but instead suggest that
the new requirements may have affected the way CEO compensation is structured, but
not the total level of compensation.
For every 1% increase in director ownership percentage, CEO compensation
increases by 13.61%. This is significant at the 10% level and has a t-statistic of 1.85. This
contradicts my hypothesis, but has a couple of reasonable explanations. A higher director
ownership  stake  in  the  firm  aligns  the  committee  chair’s  economic  interests  with  those  of  
the shareholders. Greater CEO equity incentives reflect shareholder interests because the
CEO has greater incentive to act in the interests of the company and perform well. A
greater amount of equity incentives are likely to be present when there are higher levels
of compensation in general. Another explanation for this positive correlation is that the
compensation  committee’s  higher  ownership  stake  in  the  firm  indicates their faith in the
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CEO and in the company’s  ability  to  perform  well.  This confidence in the CEO could
lead to higher levels of total compensation.
While economic incentives still account for most of the explanation of the
variance in the natural log of total CEO compensation, personal relationship/demographic
incentive variables are more significant than in the first regression. The R2 for the
regression looking only at economic variables, personal relationship/demographic
incentive variables, and group dynamics variables are 0.49, 0.39, and 0.36, respectively.
The R2 for the combined regression is 0.52, indicating that more than half of the variation
in the natural log of CEO total compensation can be explained by my model.
VII. Conclusion
Overall, my findings overlap with previous results in some areas and suggest
there has been a change in others. Compensation committee chair demographics, personal
ties to the CEO, and economic interests all play a significant role in the pay-setting
process.
When examining CEO salary as a percentage of total compensation, I find that
only personal ties to the CEO are correlated with lower-risk pay packages. The presence
of the CEO on the board of directors is positively correlated with a higher salary
percentage. This indicates CEO influence on the compensation committee because they
are more likely to develop friendships with fellow board members, or to have a previous
relationship with board members due to their influence in the director nomination
process. I also find that the percentage of CEO compensation that consists of salary is
negatively related to how much the compensation committee chair is paid, suggesting
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that they do not structure lower risk pay packages in return for higher levels of pay.
Conyon and He (2004) found the opposite result. This is the only significant variable
indicating a change in the board environment since the new regulatory requirements were
implemented.
When looking at the level of CEO compensation, I find that both personal ties to
the CEO and economic interests of the compensation committee chair are significant. If
the committee chair is a male, they are more likely to set lower levels of total CEO
compensation, suggesting that the female directors in my sample set higher levels of CEO
compensation on average. If the compensation committee chair was or is a CEO and if he
or she was appointed by the current CEO are both positively related to CEO
compensation, indicating that a personal relationship or background similarity with the
CEO leads to higher levels of pay. I also find that the more the compensation committee
chair is paid, the higher the level of CEO compensation. This is consistent with previous
research looking at this variable and could suggest mutual favors granted between the
committee chair and the CEO when setting compensation levels. A higher director
ownership stake in the company is also associated with higher levels of CEO
compensation.
In setting the percentage of contingent versus non-contingent pay, compensation
committee chairs do not seem to be  heavily  influenced  by  the  CEO’s  interests. In fact, the
negative relationship between director compensation and CEO salary percentage provides
a glimmer of hope that the pay setting environment is changing, although more research
needs to be completed before this change can be attributed to the independence
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regulations. The factors affecting the overall level of total CEO compensation suggest
that the pay-setting process is still influenced by personal ties to the CEO and by high
levels of compensation for serving on the board.
It would be useful for further research to expand upon my data by including
information for a larger number of companies and over a longer time period to effectively
analyze the impact of regulatory changes on the pay-setting process. While I am unable
to assess whether there has been a change since I only use data from 2013, my results
compared to those of previous studies suggest that the regulatory changes may not have
been as effective as they were meant to be. Further research focused on addressing this
issue is needed, especially since so many new independence requirements are still being
implemented.
It would also be interesting for future studies to include variables that go more in
depth in explaining personal ties between the compensation committee chair and the
CEO,  similar  to  Belliveau,  O’Reilly,  and  Wade  (1996).  Many of my significant variables
indicating a personal tie to the CEO could only be vaguely analyzed and suggestive of
some sort of relationship, but could not pinpoint where the relationship came from. It
would be interesting to include which undergraduate/graduate institution the director and
CEO attended, whether they previously worked for the same company, etc. to be able to
track the relationship back to a specific time and place. Unfortunately, the time frame of
this paper limited my ability to collect this information.
While my data was limited to just over 300 companies, many of my variables
were statistically significant. My data is unique because it combines a wide range of
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explanatory variables from 2013. My results are important because they indicate that
while extensive independence requirements are in place, and while compensation
committees may appear independent on paper, there are factors that continue to affect the
way they construct executive compensation. The independence requirements already in
place are costly and time-consuming for companies to comply with, and this study
suggests that there are still remaining issues that  don’t  seem  to  have changed since
previous studies were completed. Before creating new regulations, it is important to
evaluate the benefits of possibly affecting the pay-setting process and putting the public
at ease versus the costs of implementation. It is also important to see where past
requirements have been successful and where they have not so future regulators have a
better idea of how to create effective regulations governing compensation committee
independence. Many of the variables I found to be significant were indicative of a
friendship or other personal tie to the CEO, which would be difficult and costly to
measure, and even more complicated to create and implement regulations around.
Overall, my results have interesting considerations for future regulatory requirements and
provide valuable insight into the formation of executive compensation.
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Table IV

Variable Descriptions
Variable
Independent Variables

Description

Male Director

Takes  a  value  of  1  if  the  compensation  committee  chair  (“committee  chair”)  is  
a male, and a 0 if female. From 2013 proxy statements.

Same Gender

Takes a value of 1 if the committee chair and the CEO are the same gender,
and a 0 otherwise. From comparison of ExecuComp Annual Compensation
data and 2013 proxy statements data.

Director was/is a CEO

Takes a value of 1 if the committee chair was or is currently a CEO of another
company and a 0 otherwise. From 2013 proxy statements.
Takes a value of 1 if the CEO is a current director on the company board and
a 0 otherwise. From Execucomp Annual Compensation.
The number of years the committee chair has served as a director of the
company. From 2013 proxy statements.
Takes a value of 1 if the committee chair was appointed while the current
CEO was already in office. From ExecuComp Annual Compensation data
and 2013 proxy statements data.
The age of the compensation committee chair in years. From 2013 proxy
statements.
The absolute value of the age difference between the committee chair and the
CEO. From ExecuComp Annual Compensation data and 2013 proxy
statements data.
The total compensation received by the committee chair from the company for
the fiscal year in thousands of dollars. From ExecuComp Director
Compensation.
Compensation committee chair beneficial ownership as a percentage of total
company shares outstanding. Number of shares beneficially owned from 2013
proxy statements and number of shares outstanding (2013) from
COMPUSTAT.
The number of members of the compensation committee. From 2013 proxy
statements.
The number of compensation committee meetings held during FY 2013. From
2013 proxy statements.

CEO is a Director
Years Serving as Director
Director Appointed by CEO
Director Age
Absolute Value of Age Difference
Director Total Compensation
(in 1000s)
Director Ownership Percentage

Committee Size
Meetings

Dependent Variables
CEO Total Compensation

CEO Salary/CEO Total
Compensation

Total CEO compensation for 2013, comprised of salary, bonus, other annual
compensation, total value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock
options granted (using Black-Scholes), long-term incentive payouts, and all
other total compensation in thousands of dollars. From ExecuComp Annual
Compensation.
Calcuated by dividing CEO Salary/CEO Total Compensation to represent the
percentage of CEO compensation that is a fixed salary. From ExecuComp
Annual Compensation.

Control Variables
Male CEO
CEO Tenure
CEO Age

Ln(Total Assets)
Employees
Total Market Value
ROA

Takes a value of 1 if the CEO is a male, and 0 if female. From ExecuComp
Annual Compensation.
The number of years that the current CEO has been serving as CEO of the
company. From ExeuCopm Annual Compensation.
The age of the current CEO in years. From ExecuComp Annual
Compensation.
The natural log of total company assets for 2013. Calculated from
COMPUSTAT data.
The number of people the company employed during 2013. From
COMPUSTAT
The market value for the fiscal year in millions of dollars. From
COMPUSTAT.
The return on assets for the fiscal year, calculated by dividing Net
Income/Total Assets. Data in calculation from COMPUSTAT.
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Table V
Correlation Matrix
Panel 1

Ln(Total
Director
Compensation)
Ln(Director
Cash Fees)
Committee
Size
Male Director
Male CEO
Meetings
Director was/is
a CEO
Years Serving
as Director
CEO Tenure
Director
Appointed by
CEO
Director Age
CEO Age
Absolute
Value of Age
Difference
Director
Ownership
Percentage
CEO is a
Director
Ln(Total
Assets)
ROA

Ln(Director
Total
Compensation)
1.0000

Ln(Director
Cash Fees)

Committee
Size

Male
Director

Male
CEO

Meetings

0.5038

1.0000

0.0936

0.1610

1.0000

0.0274
0.0146
0.2089
0.1671

0.0122
-0.0145
0.1055
0.0970

0.0423
-0.0291
-0.0359
0.0584

1.0000
0.0786
-0.0784
0.1507

1.0000
0.0402
-0.0964

1.0000
-0.0310

-0.0523

-0.0706

0.0397

0.0899

0.1105

-0.1014

-0.2495
-0.1453

-0.1165
-0.1155

0.0027
-0.0624

0.0920
-0.0061

0.0477
-0.0584

-0.0600
-0.0060

-0.0115
-0.1178
0.0337

-0.0212
-0.1094
0.0569

0.0914
0.1082
-0.0455

01852
0.0070
0.1560

0.0112
0.0290
0.0155

-0.0192
-0.0228
0.0024

-0.0958

-0.0552

0.0068

0.0616

0.0342

-0.0800

0.0543

-0.0006

0.0397

-0.0639

-0.0251

-0.0040

0.4136

0.2571

0.2635

0.0430

-0.0136

0.1050

0.0741

0.0810

0.0628

-0.0210

0.0231

-0.0545
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Panel 2

Director
was/is a
CEO
Years
Serving as
Director
CEO
Tenure
Director
Appointed
by CEO
Director
Age
CEO Age
Absolute
Value of
Age
Difference
Director
Ownership
Percentage
CEO is a
Director
Ln(Total
Assets)
ROA

Director
was/is a
CEO
1.0000

Years
Serving as
Director

CEO
Tenure

Director
Appointed
by CEO

Director
Age

CEO
Age

Abs Value
of Age
Diff

-0.0534

1.0000

-0.0983

0.1933

1.0000

-0.500

-0.3644

0.5556

1.0000

0.0323

0.3934

0.2154

-0.0710

1.0000

-0.1741
0.0634

0.1594
0.2331

0.4724
-0.1625

0.2828
-0.2489

0.2375
0.4726

1.0000
-0.4248

1.0000

-00730

0.1427

-0.0032

-0.0708

-0.0062

-0.0406

-0.0043

0.0364

-0.0993

0.0826

0.0663

-0.0259

0.0908

-0.0786

0.1940

-0.1097

-0.1019

-0.0171

-0.0313

0.0929

-0.1657

0.0849

0.0767

0.0374

-0.0901

-0.1014

0.0329

-0.0968

Panel 3

Director
Ownership
Percentage
CEO is a
Director
Ln(Total
Assets)
ROA

Director
Ownership
Percentage
1.0000

CEO is a
Director

Ln(Total
Assets)

-0.1638

1.0000

-0.1259

-0.0526

1.0000

-0.0614

0.0218

0.1793

ROA

1.0000
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